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HOW DO FARMERS LEARN FROM EXTENSION
SERVICES? EVIDENCE FROM MALAWI
ANNEMIE MAERTENS, HOPE MICHELSON, AND VESALL NOURANI
Though extension services have long since proved their value to agricultural production and farmer
prosperity, their record in sub-Saharan Africa has been mixed. To study the impact of such programs
on farmers’ learning about agricultural technologies, we implemented a quasi-randomized controlled
trial and collected detailed panel data among Malawian farmers. Based on those findings, we develop
a two-stage learning framework, in which farmers formulate yield expectations before deciding on how
much effort to invest in learning about these processes. Using data centered on farmer beliefs, knowl-
edge, and constraints, we find evidence that beliefs about potential yields hinge on first-hand and local
experience, and that these beliefs significantly impact learning efforts. Consistent with this, we find that
farmers who participated in season-long, farmer-led demonstration plot cultivation plan to adopt more
components of newmulti-component technology, compared to farmers whowere invited to attend only
field-day events.
Key words: Agricultural extension, Learning, sub-Saharan Africa.
JEL codes: O13, O33, Q12, Q16, Q18.
Introduction
Agricultural extension can play a crucial role
in overcoming farmer information constraints
and encouraging the adoption of improved
agricultural technologies, thereby increasing
yields and incomes (Birkhaeuser, Evenson,
and Feder 1991, Picclotto and Anderson
1997, Feder, Willet, and Zijp 1999, Anderson
and Feder 2007, Davis 2008, Birner et al. 2009,
Waddington andWhite 2014). Supporting and
enhancing cost-effective agricultural exten-
sion systems is especially important in devel-
oping countries. In Malawi, where this study
is situated, agriculture employs nearly
70% of the population (2013 World Develop-
ment Indicators). As information is commonly
non-rival and non-excludable, primary
responsibility for developing and disseminat-
ing agricultural education programs falls to
governments.1 Where responsibility resides
with government extension services, effective-
ness can vary. Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and
Feder (1991) reports rates of return ranging
from negative to over 100% (see also
IEG 2011, Anderson and Feder 2007, and
Ragasa and Mazunda (2018) provide an over-
view of evaluations set in Malawi).
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1Krishnan and Patnam (2014) note that in Ethiopia in 1999 gov-
ernment extension agents served as farmers’ primary source of
information about hybrid seeds but that ten years later private-
sector seed companies assumed this role.
The effectiveness of agricultural extension
depends on the model of extension employed.
Extension can include systems of training and
visits, demonstration plots, farmer field days
and field schools (Anderson, Feder, and
Ganguly 2006). These models not only range
widely in terms of time and expense to both
farmers and implementing agencies, but also
have different implications for farmer learning
and might result in different adoption patterns.
Demonstration plots, for instance, are desig-
nated plots where farmers experiment with a
new technology under the supervision of an
extension agent. They are commonly sited in
the same village where participant farmers live,
that is, where soil and climatic conditions are
familiar and similar to most participants’ condi-
tions. Field days, in contrast, often take place
further from farmers’ communities, where local
conditions might be quite different (and per-
haps unknown). As returns to agricultural tech-
nologies are heterogeneous and depend on
these conditions (Duflo, Kremer, and Robin-
son2008;MarenyaandBarrett 2009; Suri 2011),
farmers aremore likely to learn something use-
ful about the profitability of a new technology
from local demonstration plots.2
In addition to learning about profits, farmers
learn about enhancements to the production pro-
cess including the optimal use of inputs. In
Conley and Udry (2010), Ghanian farmers con-
centrate on one dimension of a technology: the
optimal amount of fertilizer on pineapple, a new
crop in the region. Often though technologies
involve adjusting among, and hence learning
about, multiple production dimensions (see Bea-
man et al. 2013; Bulte et al. 2014; Emerick
et al. 2016; Mponela et al. 2016; Nourani 2019).
In this study, we focus on integrated soil
fertility management practices (henceforward
ISFM), a group of techniques designed to
increase the fertility of soils. ISFM includes appli-
cation of mineral fertilizers, incorporation of
organic matter, adoption of agroforestry, crop
rotation and intercropping with legumes, and
use of conservation agriculture practices. Learn-
ing about these numerous dimensions can be
demanding and farmers make choices about
what to pay attention (Schilbach, Schofield, and
Mullainathan 2016; Lichand and Mani 2020).3,4
Hence, extension service models, which
include learning-by-doing and repetition,
such as demonstration plots might be more
effective (on the value of repetition in learn-
ing, see Brown, Roediger, and McDaniel
2014, Kim, Ritter, and Koubek 2013).
If learning about the production process
comes at a significant cognitive cost, farmers
might engage in what has been termed “ratio-
nal inattention” (see Ghosh 2016 for a theoret-
ical approach on rational inattention; and
Gabaix 2017 for an overview). Thismight imply
a two-stage learning process, as in Nour-
ani (2019). Moreover, farmers using attention
strategically may focus on dimensions of the
technology where the perceived benefits might
be most likely to exceed the perceived costs.
For instance, credit-constrained farmers might
focus on the more labor-intensive dimensions
of a new production process.
In this paper we study the effects of farmer
field days and farmer demonstration plots on
farmer learning and adoption, and we present
amodel of farmer learning based on the insights
from the evaluation.We exploit rich data on soil
conditions, demonstration plot performance,
and agronomic outcomes to understand how
farmers direct their attention under time con-
straints and how spatial variability in growing
conditions impacts farmer learning and adop-
tion. To be clear at the outset, this paper is not
a horserace between extensionmodels. Instead,
we are interested in contrasting field days and
demonstration plots to gain broader and more
generalizable insights into farmer learning.
The literature on the effects of extension
struggles with two primary empirical chal-
lenges. First, farmers who seek out and receive
extension services might be more skilled and
motivated than farmers who do not seek such
services.5 Moreover, areas that attract exten-
sion services are also often areas with better
agronomic potential. Because such factors
are often unobserved by researchers, they
can cause omitted variable bias, threatening
the causal interpretation of estimated parame-
ters. A second challenge is that although an
2This is, assuming that farmers learn locally, i.e., contingent
upon soil, climate, etc.; only a yield-draw from a plot that shares
these conditions is likely to impact their own thinking and opera-
tions (on the implications of heterogeneity for social learning,
see Munshi 2004, Tjernström 2015 and Crane-Droesch 2018; on
Bayesian learning, see Lybbert et al. 2007).
3See Kahneman (1973, 2003), Gabaix et al. (2006), Fehr and
Rangel (2011), Harstad and Selten (2013), and Rabin (2013) for
an introduction to bounded rationality models.
4Hanna, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2014) show that sea-
weed farmers in Indonesia only learn to be attentive to pod size—
an important input dimension—after being presented with simple
information pointing out that it is critical.
5Owens, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2003) document the extent of
such a bias in Zimbabwe.
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extension program may be successful in terms
of knowledge diffusion, adoption among
farmers may be influenced by other factors
(market failures, logistical challenges, etc.);
and learning may not always translate into
adoption. As standard household surveys often
do not detail the learning process, studies have
often faced challenges discerning whether such
failures reside in the education process itself or
in other circumstances down the line.
We designed our study to meet these chal-
lenges.Weworked in partnership with the Clin-
ton Development Initiative (henceforward
CDI) in Malawi. CDI has set up a program of
farmer-led demonstration plots and field days
aiming to disseminate information about
ISFM—with a focus on maize and soybean
cropping systems. This process eliminates biases
originating from between-village unobserved
variation when establishing the effects of access
to field days. Using detailed village-level data,
we note that the villages in which CDI placed
demonstration plots (which, unlike the field
days, were not randomized) were comparable
to the villages that merely received access to
the field days. This observation allows us to
use a regression approach when establishing
the impacts of demonstration plots.We comple-
ment this quasi-randomized design with a
household panel survey and focus group inter-
views documenting the adoption of ISFM tech-
nologies, as well as farmer knowledge of ISFM
technology processes and yield expectations.
We find that farmers who participate in
demonstration plots plan to adopt on average,
about 14% more of the recommended ISFM
technologies one year after the program’s
start, compared to similar farmers in control
villages. Farmers who are invited to partici-
pate in a field day, on the other hand, do not
plan to adopt more of the ISFM technologies
relative to similar farmers in the control vil-
lages. We note that farmers who participate
in demonstration plots know more about soy-
bean production processes, compared to simi-
lar farmers in control villages.
Building on these results, and focus group
interviews, we develop a learning model that
captures the motivation and constraints to
learn about ISFM technologies. Although
both demonstration plot participants and
field-day participants are learning, the model
considers learning to be a choice, a choice that
is constrained by factors such as credit, time,
and cognitive resources. The learning model
proceeds in two steps: farmers first assess
potential profitability, before investing in
learning, subject to constraints. We apply the
insights of the model to the data.
First, we find that, as predicted, the farmers’
yield expectations in demonstration plot vil-
lages correlate with the observed yields of soy-
bean and maize demonstration plots, and
more strongly so if the farmers’ soil is more
similar to that of the demonstration plot.
Second, we predict that the amount of cogni-
tive effort farmers commit to learning a newpro-
duction process responds to these yield
expectations. Accordingly, we note a positive
correlation between demonstration plot yields
and the farmers understanding of ISFM produc-
tion practices (this results holds using a reduced
form approach using rainfall instruments).
Finally, we theorize that the learning process
depends on farmer wealth and cognitive costs;
as farmers who are constrained focus learning
on the technologies they can realistically adopt.
Accordingly, we find that demonstration plot
participants’ knowledge of ISFM practices for
capital-intensive technologies, such as inputs
for soybean cultivation, correlate positivelywith
farmer wealth, conditional on high observed
demonstration plot yields. For farmers who
were invited to participate in field days, we note
a similar correlation between being credit con-
strained and learning about soybean cultivation
(it is notable that we find no such result for
maize, for which recommended technologies
are more labor rather than credit intensive).
Our theoretical and empirical results give a
new meaning to the “rational but poor”
farmers thesis originally proposed by
Schultz (1964) and, subsequently tested by
others, including Hopper (1965). Indeed,
although farmers in our study might seem irra-
tional at first, in that they show evidence of
inattention to technologies that might be ben-
eficial, their learning process appears more
rational when one consider constraints
imposed by heterogeneity. In effect, farmers
in our study appear to decide actively how
much effort to put into a given learning chal-
lenge and to focus on specific aspects which
they find important. These aspects are deter-
mined by individual expectations and con-
straints, including market constraints.
CDI’s ISFM Extension Program
Soil fertility is low and declining in sub-
Saharan Africa (Sanchez 2002; Tully
et al. 2015; Njoloma et al. 2016). ISFM
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includes a range of agricultural technologies
that improve the health of the soil, that is, its
ability to store and gradually release nutrients
and water. As such, ISFM both directly and
indirectly improves yields through increasing
effectiveness of other inputs. The benefits of
ISFM in terms of increasing average yields
and reducing yield variance can be substantial
(Kerr et al. 2007; Duflo, Kremer, and Robin-
son 2008; Sauer and Tchale 2009; Fair-
hurst 2012; Bezu et al. 2014; Franke, Van
Den Brand, and Giller, 2014; Manda et al.
2016; Droppelmann, Snapp, and Wadding-
ton 2017), albeit heterogenous, and condi-
tional on farmer wealth and assets (Place
et al. 2003, Vanlauwe, and Giller 2006, Mare-
nya and Barrett 2007 and Mugwe et al. 2009).
However, the adoption of ISFM technolo-
gies in sub-Saharan Africa remains low
(Wossen, Berger, and Di Falco 2015; Nkonya
et al. 2016; Nkonya et al. 2017). Sheahan and
Barrett (2017), using the World Bank’s LSMS
surveys for six countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, note that although the uptake of inor-
ganic fertilizers and agrochemicals is not uni-
formly low (and, in fact, is high in Malawi),
there is low correlation between the use of
commonly paired inputs (fertilizer and hybrid
seed; or organic and inorganic fertilizer) at
the household and, more importantly, plot
level.6
CDI aims to increase the adoption of ISFM
technologies among smallholder farmers in
Malawi, through both extension and improved
market access. In this study, we focus on CDI’s
extension activities: farmer-led demonstration
plots and farmer field days. The annual imple-
mentation calendar for these activities follows
Malawi’s agricultural cycle. In central Malawi,
where our study is set, the rainy season starts
in November/December and ends in April/
May.
In November, CDI sets up demonstration
plots in central village locations, close to a
road, and, according to their own account, on
good quality plots. The exact location of the
demonstration plot is selected through discus-
sion with the local government extension
agent and local farmers. Once the location is
determined, a CDI extension agent sets up
the plot together with a local farmers’ club of
ten to twenty members. The CDI extension
agent continues to guide the farmer’s club
throughout the season using telephone calls
and in-person visits. The club is in charge of
the day-to-day management and the imple-
mentation of the various plot activities, includ-
ing planting, weeding, and fertilizing. All club
members are expected to take part in these
various activities as a team. These activities
can be time consuming.7 At harvest, the mem-
bers share the proceeds from the
demonstration plot.
In March, CDI selects the best performing
demonstration plots on which to hold farmer
field days. Farmers in nearby locations are
invited to attend these one-day events, with
CDI providing transportation to and from
the field-day location and a mid-day snack.
Field days are held at the end of the growing
season, and farmers observe the mature crop
on the fields. Throughout the day, the CDI
agent and local club explain and show the var-
ious ISFM techniques to the visiting farmers.
CDI typically holds one field day per EPA
(extension planning areas, a subdistrict admin-
istrative unit) and invites up to 1,000 farmers.
In the remainder of this paper, we distin-
guish between two types of treatments—a
demonstration plot treatment and a field-day
treatment. The first type of treatment refers
to the active participation and working on a
demonstration plot throughout the season.
The second type of treatment refers to attend-
ing a one-day, field-day event.
In 2014–15, the growing season under con-
sideration for this study, CDI focused on soy-
bean, maize, groundnut, and common bean.
We focus on soybean and maize demonstra-
tion plots, CDI’s primary focus. Almost all
farming households inMalawi cultivate maize:
In 2016–17, 76% of fields were under maize
cultivation (IHS 2017). Soybean cultivation
has been increasing in central Malawi and is
now an important cash crop. In our survey,
40% of households cultivated soybean in the
2013–14 season.
Demonstration plots feature both control
and best practice agronomy (BPA) subplots.
On best-practice subplots all locally recom-
mended ISFM technologies are applied,
including the use of a high-yielding hybrid
variety, optimal plant spacing and seeding
6Using the same data, we note the prevalence of ISFM practices
in Malawi: intercropping (53% of fields), application of mineral
fertilizers (55% of fields), organic fertilizers (19% of fields), and
herbicides/pesticides (2% of fields)—data from the 2016–17
round.
7In our study area planting takes, on average, three hours. Each
follow-up activity takes, on average, twenty minutes per activity,
with a total of 25–35 such activities over the season.
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practices (soy seed treated with inoculants),
mineral fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides, fungi-
cide, and the use of organic fertilizer, such as
crop residues, animal manure, compost, and
fertilizer trees. Online Appendix A provides
more detail on the demonstration plot design
and layout.
Sample, Randomization, and Data Collected
In 2014, CDI was planning an expansion of
their program into two districts in central
Malawi: Dowa and Kasungu. Dowa is a
densely populated district with lower than
national poverty rate and an average climate.
Kasungu has a lower population density, a
large hinterland and higher than average pov-
erty rate.8
Together with CDI, we selected two EPAs:
Chibvala in Dowa district and Mtumthama in
Kasungu district. The 2014 village census list-
ing of the District Agricultural Offices
included 360 villages in these two EPAs. We
randomly selected 250 from the 303 villages,
which counted at least 50 households, strati-
fied by EPA.9 Half of these villages, again ran-
domly selected and stratified by EPA, were
assigned to the treatment group and the other
half to the control group. The study sample for
this paper however is limited to 100 villages.10
In the remainder of this section, we will note
the relevant numbers in both the project sam-
ple (250 villages) and the study sample (100 vil-
lages). Table 1 presents an overview of the
study sample, treatment, and participation sta-
tus: we have fifty-six treatment villages and
forty-six control villages.We provide evidence
of the success of the randomization in Appen-
dix Table 1.
The villages in the treatment group were
invited to form farmer clubs and to participate
in CDI’s program. Farmers formed clubs in
91 out of 125 treatment villages (in our study
sample, this is 48 out of 56). Villages who
formed clubs tended to be further away from
markets and have a history of community
action.
Seventeen of the ninety-one villages (and of
the forty-eight villages in the study sample as
well) received farmer-led demonstration plots
during the 2014–15 growing season. These sev-
enteen villages were selected by CDI in
December 2014. By CDI’s own account, these
were villages with some familiarity with agri-
cultural extension services, located in an
accessible location and where people were in
“unity.”Recognizing the small sample, appen-
dix table 2 compares the demonstration plot
villages with the other treatment villages in
the study sample and reports few significant
observable differences between these two sets.
All but five villages received a soybean/maize
demonstration plot; the remaining five
received either a groundnut/maize plot or a
common bean/maize plot. The CDI agent set
up the demonstration plot in all cases, with
all CDI club members of the relevant village
assisting him/her. An analysis of the field
observation data reveals high participation
levels.11
In March 2015, CDI invited all farmer clubs
in the ninty-one villages to a farmer field day
(in the study sample, this is forty-eight villages,
including the demonstration plot villages).
Two field days were held in the study area.
Farmers in Mtumthama EPA were invited to
a local farmer field day at the best performing
CDI farmer-led demonstration plots in that
EPA. Farmers in Chibvala EPA were invited
to join a farmer field day in a neighboring
EPA (Lisasadzi EPA), due to, according to
CDI’s account, the lack of exemplary demon-
stration plots in Chibvala EPA itself. Both
field days took place at a soybean/maize dem-
onstration plot. As table 1 notes, thirty-two vil-
lages out of forty-eight villages attended the
field day. Not all farmers from these club par-
ticipate in the field day. The buses had limited
seating capacity, and farmer clubs were
encouraged to select between one and three
members to attend. On average, 2.13 club
8This area is a popular among NGOs and other organizations.
However, their activities were evenly distributed between the
treatment and control locations, and to our knowledge, none of
these organizations focused on soy production.
9As CDI works through farmer clubs and the functioning of
these clubs requires a minimum village size, we excluded the vil-
lages with less than fifty households.
10These 100 villages were selected as follows: First, we selected
90 villages randomly from the 250 project villages, stratified by
EPA and treatment status. These ninety villages included seven
villages with demonstration plots. Then, we included an additional
ten villages that had been selected as demonstration plot villages
by CDI (as to include all seventeen villages which were selected
as a demonstration plot locations).
11All club members participated in the planting activities. On
average, 77% of all club members participated in post-planting
activities, and, on average, 86% of club members participated in
the harvesting activities. The self-reported data collected among
farmers at endline is in line with these statistics: 80% of club mem-
bers noted to participate in “all” or “almost all” activities on the
demonstration plots, and only two individuals noted not to have
participated in the activities.
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members attended in our sample of five club
members.12
Data Collected
We collected data at baseline, before the treat-
ment villages participated in the program
activities (in fall 2014), and one year later
(in fall 2015).13 The baseline was conducted
in all 250 villages in the sample, whereas the
data collection the following year included
100 villages.
Before collecting baseline data, we gener-
ated a census of all households in the 250 vil-
lages as well as a census of all CDI club
members in the treatment villages. We used
these two census lists to draw a sample of ten
households for each village: in the control vil-
lages and the treatment villages without a club,
we randomly selected ten households from the
village census. In the treatment villages with
CDI clubs, we stratified the sample and sam-
pled five households not participating in a
CDI club and five participant households.14
One of the five households sampled was the
household of the lead farmer of the club, who
serves as the point of contact between CDI
and the club. The other four CDI households
were randomly selected from the list of house-
holds who belong to the CDI club. Club mem-
bers are wealthier, more educated, and better
connected than non-club members.
At baseline, we conducted a village sur-
vey15, a household survey and analyzed soil
samples from farmers’ plots and demonstra-
tion plots. One year later, we followed up with
household surveys, creating a household panel
dataset.16 Between these two rounds of data
collection, we collected field observation data
at the demonstration plot sites on a weekly
basis. We also conducted a series of focus
group interviews and interviewed extension
agents (see online Appendix B).
Household Survey
We conducted a household survey among
2,500 households in 250 villages at baseline
and among the subset of 1,000 households
in 100 villages one year later. The survey
was collected in the months of October and
November, about five months after harvest
and right before planting for the next sea-
son. We interviewed the head of the
household.
At baseline, we collected data on house-
hold composition, groups, networks and
information sources, landholding, marketing,
Table 1. Sample, Treatment and ParticipationNote: Number of villages; number of farmers in











56 48 17 32
(560) (480) (170) (320)
Control
villages
44 0 0 9
(440) (0) (0) (90)
Total 100 48 17 41
Note: This table presents an overview of the number of villages and farmers within each treatment group as pertaining to the analysis sample of this paper. The
information presented uses our administrative records on demonstration plot locations and self-reported club membership and field-day participation data
collected at endline.
12This self-reported data might be subject to measurement
error. There are many field days in the area, and some respondents
might have mixed up field days.
13Data of the project are available via FIGSHARE via: https://
figshare.com/authors/ISFM_Malawi/6943355
14In case of multiple CDI clubs in a village, we selected the club
to be included in the study randomly. In terms of the treatment, all
CDI clubs are invited in their respective village-level assigned
treatment.
15Covered information on distance to paved roads, national
highways, markets, and other services. We also collected demo-
graphic information and information on access to government
and NGO extension, civic organizations, and the price of casual
agricultural labor in different seasons. We noted the location of
the village center using GPS.
16The attrition rate is 5%—specifically, there were fifty-one
households whowere present at the baseline whowere not present
in the follow up survey. The households who left the sample are
uniformly distributed geographically and in terms of treatment sta-
tus. The households who left the sample have household heads
who are slightly younger (0.01 years – significant at the 5% level)
and slightly more educated (0.05 years – significant at the 10%
level) but do not differ in terms of household composition and
asset wealth. To keep the sample size intact, these fifty-one house-
holds were replaced in the follow up survey using the random sam-
pling methods outlined in the main text.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Households at Baseline in 2014
Variable description N Mean
St.
dev.
Panel A: Socio-economic characteristics
Gender of household head (0 = male; 1 = female) 1,000 0.18 0.38
Age of household head (years) 1,000 42.45 15.01
Education of household head (years of education) 1,000 4.59 3.43
Number of household members 1,000 5.22 2.14
Agriculture main activity of household head (1 = yes; 0 = no) 1,000 0.79 0.41
Land (in acres, owned)1 944 3.47 2.55
Are government extension agents one of three main sources of information
(no = 0; yes = 1)2
1,000 0.30 0.46
Are other farmers one of three main sources of information (no = 0; yes = 1)2 1,000 0.75 0.42
Took credit in 2013–14 season(no = 0; yes = 1)3 1,000 0.17 0.37
Panel B - Perceived soil quality4
Perceived stagnant or declining soil fertility (no = 0; yes = 1) 960 0.82 0.34
Experienced soil erosion (no = 0; yes = 1) 960 0.47 0.44
Experienced nutrient depletion (no = 0; yes = 1) 960 0.57 0.45
Experienced water logging (no = 0; yes = 1) 960 0.23 0.37
Experienced acidity or salinity (no = 0; yes = 1) 960 0.05 0.20
Panel C - Results of soil sample analysis5
pH (recall 7 is neutral, smaller is acid, larger is alkalic) 252 6.12 0.52
Active carbon (in mg/kg) 250 423 150
Limited N (no = 0; yes = 1) 252 1.00 0.00
Limited S (no = 0; yes = 1) 252 0.77 0.43
Limited K (no = 0; yes = 1) 252 0.33 0.47
Limited P (no = 0; yes = 1) 252 0.52 0.55
Panel D - Crop and technology choices
Crop and seed choices
Cultivated maize in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.96 0.19
Cultivate hybrid maize in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 961 0.62 0.49
Cultivated groundnut in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.55 0.50
Cultivated common bean in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.44 0.50
Cultivated soybean in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.46 0.50
Inoculated soybean in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1)5 463 0.00 0.65
Land preparation
Used intercropping in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.49 0.50
Used crop rotation in the last 5 years (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.82 0.38
Fertilizer
Use animal manure in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.29 0.45
Incorporated crop residue in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.14 0.35
Used inorganic fertilizer in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.88 0.31
Planted fertilizer trees in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.09 0.28
Used compost in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.019 0.13
Other inputs
Used pesticides in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.00 0.00
Used herbicide in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.05 0.21
Used fungicide in 2013–14 (no = 0; yes = 1) 1,000 0.00 0.00
Panel E - Yield expectations
Harvest of maize expected (in kg/ha) 1,000 3,599 2,288
Harvest of soy expected (in kg/ha) 993 1,608 1,336
Note: 1:We dropped farmers withmore than 13 acre (95%percentile) for these statistics. 2:We asked the respondent about the threemain sources of information
about agriculture, if the government extension agent was mentioned, we coded the first answer = yes (no otherwise); and if another farmer in the village was
mentioned, we coded the second answer = yes (no otherwise). 3: We asked the respondent whether he/she took any loans in 2013–14. Note 4: We elicited
characteristics of each field and averaged the responses across fields for each farmer (Note that the sample only includes respondents who own at least one field).
5: Panel C only includes the households who had a soil sample analysis done, 252 farmers. Definition of nutrient deficiencies: N: less than 42 mg NO₃− /kg soil; S:
less than 10 mg/kg soil, P: less than 0.3 mg/kg soil; K: less than 20 mg/kg soil.
Note:Two inoculation statistics are conditional cultivating soybean; hybridmaize use is conditional on cultivatingmaize. Yield expectations were elicited in 50 kg
bags per acre, or 50 kg bags per plot, and refer to the shelled product. Due to issues with farmers’ estimation of acreage, we used the former here, which we
converted to kg/ha, excluding outliers above the 95 percentile.
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subsidies, credit,17 and assets. At both base-
line and one year later, we collected informa-
tion on the adoption of ISFM technologies
and yield expectations. One year after base-
line, we also collected data on participation
in the program and knowledge of ISFM tech-
nologies. We inquired about the knowledge
of CDI’s programs, participation and experi-
ences in CDI’s field days, participation and
experiences in CDI club activities, and dem-
onstration plot activities.
Adoption of ISFM Technologies. At baseline,
we collected information on current use of
ISFM technologies. To obtain a longer term
picture, we also collected information on ISFM
technologies used in the past five years, asking
the farmer whether in the last five years, they
had (ever) used a particular technology.
One year later, we repeated the input–
output questionnaire (this time focusing on
the 2014–15 season) and added a new module
on adoption plans. We asked whether or not
the respondent planned to adopt a particular
technology (in the 2015–16 season) and, if so,
followed up with details and, if not, asked for
reasons for non-adoption. Our choice to use
adoption plans (and not actual adoption) was
data driven. As our goal was to document the
learning process, we returned to the villages
after the growing season was finished but
before the next growing season had started.
This ensures quality data on knowledge and
beliefs but limits the adoption analysis to
adoption plans.18
Knowledge about ISFM Technologies. We
build on Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu (2015)
and incorporated twenty questions designed
to assess knowledge about the ISFM tech-
niques introduced by CDI and field this mod-
ule in the follow-up survey.19 The questions
covered ISFM practices for soybean, ground-
nut, and maize. Responses were true/false,
multiple choice, or numerical. Questions ran-
ged from listing the general benefits of certain
ISFMpractices, such as the benefits of growing
soy bean in crop rotation, and covering the soil
with crop residues, as well as knowledge about
how-to-apply ISFM practices including: how
many weeks after planting should you apply
urea fertilizer on maize; what chemical is best
for controlling soy rust; where on the field
should one plant fertilizer trees; and when
mixing inoculant, how many table spoons of
sugar should one add to the inoculant bag.
We code the answers as correct/incorrect and
compute a total knowledge score (out of 20).
Yield Expectations. We build on Delavande,
Giné, and McKenzie (2011a); Delavande,
Giné, and McKenzie 2011b); Dillon (2016);
and Maertens (2017) to elicit yield expecta-
tions at both baseline and endline. We focus
on soybean, groundnut and maize. At base-
line, we asked the respondent: “Imagine that
you would cultivate maize this coming year
(and that maize is the only crop on the field,
i.e., no intercropping), how much maize do
you think you would harvest on one acre of
land” We recorded the answer in 50 kg bags
of shelled or unshelled maize. We then
repeated these questions for soybean
(in 50 kg bags of shelled soybean) and ground-
nut (in 50 kg bags of unshelled, dried
groundnut).20
Field Observations on Demonstration Plots
We visited the demonstration plots two weeks
after planting to record germination and
record activities and inputs used to up to that
date. Data on agronomic practices were
recorded via a phone call with the lead farmer
on a weekly basis between planting and har-
vesting. During this weekly phone call we
recorded any activity that had taken place,
17We asked the household head to list all lines of credits taken
up in 2013–14, the terms of the credit, and where he/she would
go if he would like to obtain credit for the next (2014–15) season
(and how likely he/she believes credit can be obtained from this
source).
18Using recall data collected five years after the baseline survey,
mapped up adoption plans into recalled adoption. The accuracy
ranges from 50% to 95%, with the error in the direction of under-
reporting adoption (compared to the recall), except for with fertilizer
tree and groundnut where the direction of the error is the opposite.
The fact that the direction of the bias is opposite what one would
expect (one would expect plans to “exceed” actions) is concerning.
In addition, attrition and recall bias might play a role. Hence, we only
report results regarding adoption plans in this paper.
19See Pan et al. (2018) for another example, we mapped up
adoption plans with recalled adoption. See also Laajaj and
Macours (forthcoming) for a critical discussion of various mea-
sures of ability, skill, and knowledge.
20In our baseline data, 75% of the plots were monocropped, but
intercropping was common. Due to the complexity in generating
per-acre beliefs on intercropped fields, we asked the respondent
to imagine a monocropped field. The unit was determined in qual-
itative interviews preceding the data collection as most common
unit people think about for the crop. In addition, we recognize
the difficulty in imagining the exact size of one acre of land, and
in the formulation of this question we often referred to a 70 by
70 feet area or provided a comparison field in the village. How-
ever, we do expect measurement error due to the lack of ability
to imagine exactly the size of one acre and also asked the respon-
dent for the expected yields on a particular field, instead of a per-
acre basis (see also Bevis and Barrett 2020).
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such as applying fertilizer or other inputs, and
the number of clubmembers and other visitors
present for the activity (including whether the
CDI extension agent was present). Rainfall
gauges were mounted on each demonstration
plot and the lead farmer was trained to record
rainfall on a daily basis.
At harvest, we visited the demonstration
plots and collected crop yield data. We
recorded the stand count at harvest, the total
biomass, grain yield, and stover or leafy bio-
mass. Grain moisture content was determined
using a Mini GAC plus moisture meter. It is
important to note that the club members were
present during these on-field activities and,
hence, are expected to have good idea of the
planting and harvesting counts.
Soil Sampling and Analysis. The key indica-
tors of land fertility in the study area are soil
pH and organic matter content (see
Snapp 1998). We collected soil samples from
a total of 252 farmers’ fields in addition to the
nineteen demonstration plots during
November–December 2014 and 2015.21 It is
important to note that the results of these soil
analyses were not shared with the farmers
until after the study was completed.
For each field, we recorded the cropping his-
tory, the GPS coordinates at the center of the
field, and the field acreage by walking around
the field. We then collected two soil samples
at 0–20 cm soil depth. These samples were
thenmixed to make a composite sample. After
collection, the soil samples are put in soil sam-
pling bags and taken to the Bunda College Soil
and Plant Analysis Laboratory for analysis. If
the soils were wet upon arrival at the labora-
tory, the samples were first air dried. When
dry, we sieved them through a 2 mm sieve
and recorded the soil texture using the hand
feel method.
We use the SoilDoc program to analyze the
sample pH, nitrate nitrogen (NO−3 ), inorganic
phosphorus (P), sulfur (S), exchangeable
potassium (K) and electrical conductivity
(EC), and active carbon (C). See
Gatere (2013) and Weil and Gatere (2015)
for an introduction to SoilDoc. Note that we
did not measure the total organic carbon mat-
ter, a measure of carbon contained within the
soil organic matter, and generally accepted to
be a good summarymeasure of overall soil fer-
tility. Instead, we measured active carbon,
which compared to total organic carbon, is
more sensitive to management effects and
more closely related to soil productivity and
biologically mediated soil properties, such as
respiration, microbial biomass and aggrega-
tion (Weil et al. 2003).
Descriptive Statistics
The households in our study area are land-
poor and dependent on rainfed agriculture.
Table 2, panel A, introduces the households.
We present baseline statistics of the house-
holds in the 100 villages who were revisited
one year after baseline. The average house-
hold head is 42 years and has 4.5 years of edu-
cation. About 18% of household heads are
female, and the average household has 5.22
household members. Only 17% of respon-
dents stated that they had taken out credit
the previous season. Respondents report
receiving information from both government
extension agents and fellow farmers. About
40% of respondents report having interacted
with government extension agents, and
another 20% report to interact often to very
often. For 30% of respondents, extension
agents are one of the main sources of
information.
On average, households own 3.5 acres of
land. Although this figure excludes outliers
above the 95 percentile, it might still appear
high. It is important to note however that the
median field size is small, 1.5 acres, and likely
to be an overestimate (these are self-reported
acreages, which are often overestimated in
the case of smaller plots; see Bevis and Bar-
rett 2020 for a discussion).
Plots of land are small and population den-
sity is high in the area, according to the respon-
dents’ own account often the result of
generations of plots being subdivided for
inheritance. A lack of land can further reduce
land quality, as leaving fields fallow or using
crop rotation might no longer be options for
many households. Soil fertility in the study
area is low and declining. Soils are classified
as Ferralsols, Lixisols, and Plinthosols (FAO
Harmonized World Soil Database). A com-
mon feature of these soil types is that they
21First, we selected all ten sample farmers who live in villages
where a CDI demonstration plot was set up. Second, we randomly
selected twenty treatment villages and nine control villages, and
approached all ten farmers in each village for soil sampling. Third,
we selected ten villages purposefully, for their relatively higher
share of female-headed households and collected a soil sample
from all ten sample households in these villages. This results in a
total of 560 farmers, of which 225 live in villages that were covered
by our follow up survey.
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depend on the addition of organic and inor-
ganic matter to improve soil structure and
overall fertility. Our respondents report soil
fertility problems (see table 2, Panel B): 80%
of farmers perceive the average soil fertility
to be stagnant or declining. Common reported
problems are soil erosion, water logging, and
nutrient depletion.
The soil sample analysis results, summa-
rized in table 2, panel C, confirm these reports.
Soils are slightly acidic and with low to very
low active carbon in 30% of soils tested and
at a medium level in another 40%. Results
indicate that organic carbon is mostly
sufficient to maintain soil structure but still
low. We document widespread nutrient defi-
ciencies. All soils tested are nitrogen
(N) deficient, 77% are sulfur (S) deficient,
52% are phosphorus (P) deficient and 33%
are potassium (K) deficient. Over 50% of soils
tested were deficient in three or more nutri-
ents. The intraclass correlation between
observations of the same village is below 0.5
for measures of nitrogen and potassium, indi-
cating significant within-village variation in
these measures.
Table 2, panel D, reports farmer cultivation
practices in 2013–14. Almost all respondents
cultivated maize (of which 62% opted for a
hybrid variety) and less than half cultivated
soybean, common bean, and groundnut. Over
80% had used crop rotation (in the last five
years), whereas about half reported using
intercropping in 2014–15. Nearly 88% had
used mineral fertilizer (Malawi has a large-
scale mineral fertilizer subsidy program tar-
geting small-holder farmers). Animal manure
had been used by 30% (but compost was not
common), 14% had incorporated crop residue
in the soil, and 9% had planted fertilizer trees.
The use of other inputs is not very common.
Less than 5% had used pesticides, herbicide
or fungicide; and only two soy growing farmers
had inoculated the seed.
Table 2 panel E reports on the farmers’
baseline yield expectations for maize and soy-
bean. Farmers expect to harvest, on average,
3,480 kg/ha (or 29 kg bags per acre) of maize.
This is significantly larger than the average
yield on the farmers’ plots in 2013–14, which
was 1,750 kg/ha for mono-cropped plots.
However, it is important to keep in mind that:
(a) the yield expectation distribution is not
normal, with a long left tail—in effect the
median of the distribution is 3,088 kg/ha; and
(b) the beliefs are reflect also perceived acre-
age, which, in our data, are overestimated for
smaller plots and underestimated for larger
plots (we know this, as for a subset of the plots,
we also have the GPS measured acreage).
Farmers expect to harvest, on average,
1,608 kg/ha or (13 kg bags per acre) of shelled
soybean. This is larger than the average actual
yield in 2013–14 (312.5 kg/ha, on mono-
cropped plots). Again, the same disclaimers
apply, and it should be noted that the median
yield expectation is 1,235 kg/ha.
As a comparison, appendix table 3 presents
the yields obtained on the demonstration plots
in 2014–15. We focus on maize and soybean
subplots. Maize grain yield was variable and
ranged from 452 kg/ha under control treat-
ment to 8,990 kg/ha under best practice agron-
omy. The latter is within the range of potential
yields for maize, ranging from 6,000 to
14,000 kg/ha (depending on the variety, see
MAIFS 2012). Overall, the use of best agron-
omy practices increased maize yield by 62%
and 25% over the control and farmer practice
treatments respectively. Differences in grain
yield of soybean between the treatments and
sites are also significant. Yields range from
0 (crop failure) to 2,218 kg/ha. The use of best
agronomy practices increased the yield of soy-
bean by 50.4% over the control. Overall, the
yields of soybean are somewhat lower than
the potential yield of 2,000–4,000 kg/ha but in
the range of the attainable yields on small-
holder farms (1,500–2,500 kg/ha) with good
agronomic practices (MAIFS 2012).22
Insights from Focus Group Interviews
We interviewed farmers who participated in
demonstration plots, and farmers who partici-
pated in field days. The latter reported being
impressed by the crops they saw during the
field day but were unable to estimate the
improvement in yields. They noted being con-
vinced that pesticides and, more generally,
“modern inputs” are important. However,
when we inquired about specifics related to
pesticide use, for instance, few of the field-
day participants knew brand names, where to
purchase these inputs, or how to prepare and
apply the products. We hypothesize that by
virtue of being matched to a plot that is further
afield, they learned little about the profitability
of ISFM technologies; and being less
22The lower than attainable yield performance on some of the
demonstration plots could also be attributed to the poor rainfall
distribution in the 2014–15 cropping season.
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convinced about the benefits of the technol-
ogy, as well as facing a strict time constraints,
they focus on components of the technology
they can realistically adopt. Consistent with
this, these farmers reported to focus on labor-
intensive technologies for maize, such as
mulching and optimal planting practices.
Farmerswho participated in a demonstration
plot, on the other hand, were able to estimate
yield improvements and recalled details about
the inputs and production practices. For
instance, these farmers were able to recount
the inoculation process for soybean seeds, from
preparing the inoculant to covering the seeds
and planting them on ridges. We hypothesize
that these farmers, having observed the yield
improvements on a local plot, learned more
about the profitability the technologies. In
addition, they reported to face fewer time con-
straints and hence came away with stronger
comprehension of ISFM technologies.
Online Appendix B provides more details.
A Model of Learning
We build on Foster and Rosenzweig (1995);
Hanna,Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2014);
andNourani (2019) tomodel the farmer’s learn-
ing and adoption decision as an optimal portfo-
lio choice with multiple objects of learning
under a range of initial endowments.
Yields
We introduce three production technologies: a
capital-intensive technology indexed K, a
labor-intensive technology indexed L and a
traditional, risk-free technology. Each risky
technologyK and L has average per-acre pay-
offs (yields) of μj (j  {K, L}) — yields associ-
ated with the risk-free technology are
normalized to one. Furthermore, we assume
that the yields from the capital-intensive tech-
nology are higher than the labor-intensive
technology: μK > μL > 1.
Prices
We assume that the farmer does not need to
learn about prices. The output price is normal-
ized at 1. The input prices are denoted pj.
23
Two-stage approach
The farmer first establishes a belief of the yield
and then invests resources to generate knowl-
edge, that is, learn about the production pro-
cess, and makes decisions as to which
technologies to adopt.
Learning about yields
We assume that the true value of μj is
unknown to the farmer. Let the prior belief
about μj, μ̂j, be normally distributed, centered
around the true value, with variance σ2μ. So
each farmer’s prior belief represents a draw
of the distribution:
ð1Þ μ̂j N μj,σ2μ
 
:
When observing yields on the demonstra-
tion plot, either in the village, or at a field
Table 3. The Impact of the CDI Program on
(Planned) Adoption and Knowledge of ISFM
Technologies
Linear model with dependent variables:
Adoption Knowledge
(1) (2)
Demonstration plot 0.535** 0.29
(0.246) (0.279)






Note: This table present the results of linear regressions with dependent
variables: planned adoption (score out of 13) and knowledge (score out of 20).
The independent variables are whether or not the individual is in a club which
managed a demonstration plot and whether or not the individual is in a club
that was invited to a farmer field day. The sample includes all but forty-two
club-members and a comparable sample of farmers from the control villages
identified through 1-to-1 matching without replacement following the
psmatch2 Stata command developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). The
control variables used in this first matching step include all village level
characteristics included in appendix table 1, all household level characteristics
included in appendix table 4 (and the square terms of the non-binary




23Farmers indicated that they base their output price beliefs on
the previous year’s prices, which were well known. Input prices
could be obtained from local agro-dealers and might not be
known. However, as the CDI program did not explicitly provide
information on input prices nor did we collect details on learning
about input prices, we abstain from modeling this component of
the learning process. See alsoMichler et al. (2019) for a discussion.
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day, the farmer receives an unbiased informa-
tion signal υj. This signal is the sum of the true
yield μj plus a noise term, ηj, normally distrib-
uted around zero with variance σ2η:
ð2Þ υj = μj + ηj with ηj N 0,σ2η
 
:
Values of σ2η can depend on a farmer’s
beliefs about the degree of similarity between
conditions surrounding his own plot and those
of the demonstration or field-day plot. How-
ever, to maintain simplicity, we will abstract
from this farmer dependency in our notation.
Assuming the farmer uses Bayesian updating,
then noisier signals are down weighted in pos-









Thus, the posterior beliefs will decrease (rel-
ative to the prior) if the signal received is less
than the prior and increase otherwise. The
degree of change in posterior beliefs depends
on the signal υj and the farmer’s perception of
the relative noisiness of the signal.
Equation (3) implies that the posterior
belief represents the weighted average
between the prior belief and the signal
received. In regression terms, this implies:
ð4Þ μpij = α+ β1μ̂ij + β2υij + εij
Production process
If production inputs (e.g., fertilizer, herbicide,
labor) are inaccurately applied farmers incur
a knowledge penalty (Foster and Rosenz-
weig 1995). Specifically, let θ*j indicate the
optimal amount of input required for technol-
ogy j. If the farmer applies input θj instead of
θ*j , he incurs a (per-unit) loss equal to
θj−θ*j
 2
> 0 for all θj≠θ*j .
Learning about the production process
The optimal input use, θ*j , of technology j is
also unknown. Let the prior belief, θ̂j, be nor-
mally distributed and centered at θ*j :
ð5Þ θ̂j N θ*j ,σ2θj ej
   j ej 0,1f g,
Note the dependency of the belief on learn-
ing effort, denoted ej. The beliefs are more
precise if the farmer applies a discrete learn-
ing effort, ej = 1, compared to no learning





, is therefore larger
without learning effort.
ð6Þ σ2θj ej = 1
 
< σ2θj ej = 0
 
Payoffs
The farmer holds initial wealth w0 and is
tasked with choosing the optimal amount of
wealth to invest in each production technol-
ogy, xj, each unit of which costs pj to purchase.
At harvest, the farmer receives the following
payoff:24:







−ej1 ej = 1
 ð7Þ
where ej represents the cognitive cost associ-
ated with gaining knowledge of production
technique j and only contributes to payoffs
when learning effort is applied (1 is the indica-
tor function). The input amount for the risk-
free technology is denoted x1 and its cost p1.
Expected Payoff Maximization. Given the
presence of credit market imperfections, the
farmer’s problem will be one of maximization
of expected payoffs given a budget constraint.
The farmer chooses values of xj, θj, and ej given
values of μpj and pj for both j {K, L}. The
choice of θj is straightforward if the farmer
selects a positive value for xj: he selects θj = θ̂j
to minimize expected square loss. We focus
on whether the farmer applies effort toward
learning to produce j (ej) and the amount of
xj. Let P represent expected payoffs. The
farmer’s problem is now:
24We abuse notation slightly here. This expression should use
the realized yield and not the (posterior) belief, μpj :This is rectified
in the next expression, which refers to the expectation instead.
12 Month 2020 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.



















j K,Lf gpjxj ≥ 0ð8Þ
Solution
Given the discrete natureof learning effort in our
setup, we can find the solution to problem (8) by
backward induction.We first determine the opti-
mal value of xj given each choice of ej; and then
plug this value back into the objective function
of problem (8) to determinewhich levels of effort
result in the highest expected payoff.
First order conditions on xj yield the follow-
ing demand function:
ð9Þ x*j =




Expression (9) intuitively shows that
demand for production technology xj is
increasing in the net (perceived) returns of
the production method and knowledge of the
production process. Demand is decreasing
with the penalty associated with violating the
budget constraint, λ. The presence of borrow-
ing constraints will result in corner solutions
(of xj), including non-adoption. Depending
on the exact nature of the constraint, and the
farmer’s belief regarding the expected profit-
ability of technology j, the farmer may decide
to limit his attention to only learning about
one or the other technology. Specifically, the
farmer chooses to allocate learning effort on
a combination of technologies, resulting in
four possible combinations in our setting:
e = [{0, 0}, {1, 0}, {0, 1}, {1, 1}] where the first
argument refers to technology K and the sec-
ond argument refers to technology L. Notice
that P x*K eKð Þ,x*L eLð Þ,eK ,eL
 
can be calculated
for each of the four discrete choices a farmer
can make. Thus, the farmers optimal learning
effort vector, e*, can be characterized by:
e*such that e0½ 0,0f g, 1,0f g,


























From (8) it is clear that the farmer will not
exert effort in learning a new technology if its
yields (net of costs) are smaller than 1—the
yield of the risk-free technology. The choice
of effort, in all other circumstances will depend
on the decreased uncertainty arising from
learning about technology j relative to alterna-
tive technologies as described in equation (10)
and accounting for the cost of learning.
Holding the price of inputs and cost of learn-
ing effort fixed, this would imply a positive
relationship between posterior yield beliefs
and knowledge for any given technology. In
regression terms, we test the hypothesis that
β1 > 0 in:
ð11Þ knowledgeij = α+ β1μpij + εij
Similarly, we expect to find a positive rela-
tionship between the posterior beliefs and
the adoption of any given technology. In
regression terms, this implies:
ð12Þ xij = α+ β2μpij + εij
Where we test the hypothesis β2 > 0.
Choosing what to learn
Recall that we assumed that the capital-
intensive technology generate higher average
returns, that is, μK > μL. We now, in addition,
assume that they are also more expensive to
purchase, or: pK > pL. Furthermore, we
denote πj, the average profit gain from an
added unit of technology j, (i.e., πj = μj − pj),
and we assume that πK > πL.
When the budget constraint binds, then
λ > 0, and (8) can be solved by entering opti-
mal values of x*j into the budget constraint
and equating the left- and right-hand sides. In





j = 0 by replacing expressions
of x*j with the expression in equation (9).
λ=
pLπLσ2 eLð Þ+ pKπKσ2 eKð Þ−2w0σ2 eLð Þσ2 eKð Þ
p2Lσ






As can be seen, the Lagrangianmultiplier, or
borrowing-constraint penalty, λ, is decreasing
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in wealth and exhibits a complex relation-
ship between input price and knowledge.
Specifically, there is a cross-technology,
knowledge-uncertainty trade off that mani-
fests itself in the multiplication of the knowl-
edge penalty of one technology with the
price of the second technology. Depending
on the underlying parameter space, this
trade off will lead to selective learning about
one technology over the other if the budget
constraint binds.
We can now compute the expected payoffs for
the optimal solution using equation (8). In partic-
ular, when borrowing constraints do not bind,
then λ = 0 and xj can be computed for all combi-
nationsof learning effort using equation (9). Plug-
ging this information back into (8) will, by
comparing across the four alternatives, yield the
optimal combination of effort and technology
uptake, and resulting expected payoff.
When borrowing constraints do bind, then λ
is given by the top equation in (13), and we
can similarly compute expected payoff for all
combinations of learning effort. Again, we
compare expected payoffs across the four alter-
natives (as per (10)) and identifyP* as themax-
imum value across the four alternatives.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the
expected payoff and the farmer’s initial wealth
w0 for each of the four possible learning com-
binations.25 We graph each learning
combination separately. The largest expected
payoff is determined by the particular value
of initial wealth each farmer holds. Notice that
expected payoffs are monotonically increasing
in wealth but that there are thresholds at
which farmers may choose to learn about nei-
ther technology K or L (lowest wealth cate-
gory), either one of K or L (mid-tier wealth),
or both K and L (unconstrained by wealth).
Thus, we should only expect wealthy farmers
to learn about the most capital-intensive com-
ponents of new technologies. However, this is
strongly contingent on the assumption that
πk > > πL. If beliefs about πk are not suffi-
ciently high, then even a wealthy farmer will
choose not to learn about technology K
because it is preferable to specialize in the
labor-intensive mode of production.26 The
regression implications of figure 1 is:
knowledgeiK = αK + β1KπiK + β2Kwi + β3KwiπiK
+ εiK ,
ð14Þ
where πiK captures the profit gain observed by
farmer i of technology K and wi captures
farmer i’s wealth. We hypothesize that β3K is
positive.
Impact on Knowledge and Adoption Plans
To estimate the impact of the CDI program,
one would ideally run a regression such as
specification (15) linking outcomes Yij of
farmer i from village j, on whether or not the
farmer is a member of a club which is invited
to participate in demonstration plots T1 or
only field days T2
27:
ð15Þ Yij = α0 + α1T1ij + α2T2ij + ϵij










Figure 1. Predicted relationship between
expected payoff and wealth (through applying
various levels of effort).
Note: Parameters for the model are the following. πL = 5; πK = 5.8; σ(0) = 3;
σ(1) = 1; e = 3.
25This figure assumes that the cost of learning about
technology L is the same as that of learning about
technology K and the knowledge benefit is similarly equiva-
lent: eK ,σ2K 0ð Þ,σ2K 1ð Þ

 
= eL,σ2L 0ð Þ,σ2L 1ð Þ

 
= e,σ2 0ð Þ,σ2 1ð Þ
 .
26This is demonstrated in Appendix Figure 2, which relaxes this
assumption and varies the difference between πK and πL while
holding w0 fixed at a sufficiently high level (allowing adoption of
the capital-intensive technology). Notice that the farmer will never
choose to learn about K when πK − πL is sufficiently small— and
certainly will never learn about K when πk < πL.
27Note that the demonstration plot villages were also invited to
field days, implying that the demonstration plot effect should be
seen as the demonstration plot plus field-day effect. In practice
only about half of the demonstration plot participants attended a
field day.
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However, although being invited to a
farmer field day is randomized at the village
level, a critical aspect of participation is a
choice: farmers have to sign up for CDI clubs
in order to become eligible for the CDI activi-
ties. As one is unlikely to be able to control for
all relevant confounding factors—many are
unobservable to the researcher such as cli-
matic factors and personal attributes—we
might expect a correlation between ϵij and Tij
and Tij, resulting in omitted variable bias.
Appendix tables 2 and 4 shed light on this
participation decision. Recall that forty-eight
out of fifty-six treatment villages formed clubs.
Appendix table 2 presents, in columns
(8) through (14), the descriptive statistics of
villages that formed CDI clubs and villages
that did not form CDI clubs, along with the
results of the t-test. Although the sample sizes
are small, the CDI villages appear to be differ-
ent from the eight villages that did not form
clubs: the latter are better connected, a smaller
acreage under soy, and have fewer existing
organizations and groups. In appendix table 4,
column (14), we show the result of t-tests test-
ing the baseline differences between club and
non-club members in the villages that formed
clubs. Club members are different from non-
club members in many dimensions, and this
difference is both statistically and economi-
cally significant. Compared to non-club mem-
bers, club members are better educated, have
larger families and more land, and are also
more likely to take agricultural credit.28
Our estimation strategy tries to take this
self-selection into account by constructing
two comparable samples: the sample of house-
holds that received the CDI program and a
comparable sample of households, in the con-
trol villages, that do not received the program.
Using this approach, we assume that the treat-
ment villages are comparable to the control
villages; and we can use the latter to construct
a similar sample (we presented evidence of the
similarity between treatment and control vil-
lages in Appendix Table 1). In the first step
we followHörner et al. (2019) and use propen-
sity score matching to select a set of farmers
from the control group comparable to the club
farmers in the treatment group (see Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983, 1985) and Stuart and
Rubin (2008) for an introduction). The
propensity, or probability, to join a club is a
function of baseline characteristics as in:
ð16Þ P clubij
 
= β0 + β1Xij + β2Xj + μij
The control variables used in this first step
include all village level characteristics
included in Appendix Table 1 (Xj), all house-
hold level characteristics included in appendix
table 4 (and the square terms of the non-
binary variables) and baseline adoption indi-
cators (Xij). Appendix Figure 3 shows the
result of this exercise: although we are able
to identify amatch formost treatment farmers,
there are forty-two treatment farmers without
a match, that is, which are off support, and the
mean bias in the matched sample is 6%.29
In the second step, we regress a series of
outcome variables following regression equa-
tion (15) on the matched sample. The depen-
dent variables yij include the planned
adoption (2015–16 season) of soybean, inocu-
lation of soybean, groundnut, hybrid maize,
herbicide, pesticide, fungicide, inorganic fertil-
izer, fertilizer tree, intercropping, animal
manure, crop residue, and compost, and
whether or not each one of the questions in
the knowledge test was answered correctly.
We also compute an adoption score (out of
13) and knowledge score (out of 20).
Selection into T1ij (as opposed to T2ij) might
still be a concern. However, as noted earlier,
the demonstration plot villages are compara-
ble to the other treatment villages (see appen-
dix table 2). Appendix table 5 shows that this
lack of selection might not hold at the individ-
ual level—as demonstration plot farmers
appear somewhat wealthier and less credit-
constrained than the CDI club members who
did not manage demonstration plots. As a
robustness check, we present the results of
two alternative estimation strategies in online
Appendix C, including a household fixed
effect estimation, and an alternative matching
technique that does not drop any observations
in the treatment group.
Note that the study design and implementa-
tion have implications for the interpretation of
results. The sampling frame (stratified along
club-member status) and partial compliance
among the clubs assigned to the field-day
28This is consistent with Laajaj and Macours (2017) who find
that when the village is asked to select farmers to run demonstra-
tion plots, that these are wealthier, higher educated, and with
larger families.
29We use 1-to-1 matching without replacement following the
psmatch2 Stata command developed by Leuven and Sia-
nesi (2003). See also appendix table 10 for the result of a t-test
comparing the treatment and control group of the matched
sample.
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treatment, implies that we conducted an
intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis on the sample
of club members. This is thus neither the effect
on those who attend the field day nor the aver-
age effect at the village level. Rather, it is the
average effect of being invited to field days
on those who are its primary targets. This esti-
mate is of interest to both policymakers and
practitioners. CDI formed the clubs with the
purpose of information sharing and explicitly
requested the club members who attended
the field day to share the information with
the othermembers, and, in a way, this is amea-
sure of the success of this process.30
Table 3, column (1), shows that demonstra-
tion plot participation increases planned adop-
tion of ISFM practices by 0.54 points, which is
14%, whereas being invited to a field day does
not produce such (statistically significant)
result. In appendix table 6, we present the
results of a series of linear probability models.
We note that being a member of a demonstra-
tion plot club increases the chances of planning
to inoculate soybean (at the 1% level), using
hybridmaize (at the 1% level) and planting fer-
tilizer trees (at the 10% level), and being mem-
ber of a club that was invited to a field day
increases the chances of cultivating soybean.
As a comparison point, the point estimates of
the alternative matching strategy and farmer-
fixed effects are, respectively, 0.79 points and
0.34 points (although only the former is statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level).
Table 3 column (2) present the impacts on
the knowledge score (out of 20).31 We do not
Table 4. Correlates of Yield Expectations for Demonstration Plot Farmers at Endline, in
2015OLS Regression of Yield Expectations at Endline (in kg/ha)
Soybean Hybrid maize Local maize
Below/above median absolute
difference between soil qualities Similar Different Similar Different Similar Different
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yield expectations at baseline
[in kg/ha]
0.015 0.256 0.431* 0.254 0.089 0.096
(0.096) (0.240) (0.201) (0.151) (0.132) (0.132)
Difference between BPA/control
subplots on local demonstration
plot [in kg/ha]
0.777** 0.121 1.003*** 0.292 0.093 0.218
(0.292) (0.404) (0.155) (0.454) (0.204) (0.378)
Observations 24 26 40 41 40 41
R-squared 0.459 0.496 0.414 0.299 0.186 0.169
Note:This table present the results of a linear regressionwith dependent variable: Yield expectation at endline. Columns (1) and (2) refer to soybean, columns (3)
and (4) to hybrid maize, and columns (5) and (6) to local maize. We split the sample according to absolute difference in soil quality between the local
demonstration plot and the farmer’s plot (measured by active carbon in mg/kg): columns (1), (3) and (5) include the observations below the median of this
distribution (“similar”), whereas columns (2), (4) and (6) include the observations above the median of this distribution (“different”) (the median absolute
difference is 125 mg/kg for the soy demo sites, and 146 mg/kg for the maize demo sites). The yield expectations at baseline refer to the baseline expectations of
soy in the case of columns (1) and (2) and maize in the case of the other columns. Similarly, the differences between BPA and control subplots refer to the mean
differences between these two treatments on the local demonstration plot (adjusted for moisture content). Other control variables included but not reported:
gender household head, age household head, education household head (years), number of household members, number of adult household members,
maximum education level in the household, acreage of land owned, value of all assets (excluding land), and whether the household cultivated hybrid maize in
2013–14 (for columns (3) through (6) only). Sample includes the club farmers in the demonstration plot villages (SeeAppendix Table 4).Whether or not farmer is
in a club is determined by the self-reported club status at endline. Note that the sample size is lower than expected: 81 for the maize regressions and 50 for the
soybean regressions. This is due to missing data on soil characteristics at the individual’s level, and one case of missing demonstration plot yield data as farmers




30In appendix table 5 we presents the p-values of a t-test, com-
paring farmers who attended field days, which those CDI club
members who did not attend field days (column (7)).We note con-
siderable differences: farmers who attend field days are higher
educated, ownmore land and are overall wealthier and better con-
nected, and aremore likely to use credit. This is consistent with the
observation that in most clubs, it is the lead farmer who attended
the field days.
31In appendix table 7, we present the summary statistics. The
overall knowledge score is 7.87 (with a standard deviation of
2.30). We note that although most respondents are aware of the
general benefits of soy, fewer know the details of the production
process in terms of which pesticides and fungicides one should
apply following best practices. The share of correct answers drops
even further—to under 10%—when we ask the respondent to tell
us about the details of soybean input preparation and application.
For maize, a crop with which farmers have extensive experience,
farmers seem to be aware of certain ISFM technologies, such as
the use of crop residues and fertilizer trees, but have limited
knowledge of the details of the production process as well.
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note a significant increase in overall knowl-
edge score among either set of farmers. In
appendix table 6, we present the result of the
individual linear probability models, taking
as a dependent variable whether or not the
farmer answered each of the knowledge ques-
tions correctly. We note an increase in the
knowledge of inoculation and possibly pesti-
cides (and a negative effect on question
(14)—but the negative, tricky formulation of
that question cautions against over-interpreta-
tion). As a comparison point, the point esti-
mates of the alternative matching strategy is
0.63 points for demonstration plot partici-
pants, which is about 8% (p-value of 0.11).
Analysis of the Learning Process
Correlates of Yield Expectations
In table 4 we estimate regression specification
(4) for the demonstration plot farmers. We
regress endline yield expectations for soybean,
hybrid maize, and local maize (in kg/ha) on
yield expectations at baseline (in kg/ha) and
the performance of the local demonstration
plots (in particular, the mean differences
between BPA and control subplots; also in
kg/ha, and a series of control variables). In
the seventeen demonstration plot villages,
there were seventeen villages in which the
demonstration plot included maize and twelve
villages in which the demonstration plot
included soybean. The total number of CDI
club members in these seventeen villages is
101, and the total number of club members in
the subset of twelve villages is 69.
We split the sample according to absolute
difference in soil quality between the local
demonstration plot and the farmer’s plot
(measured by active carbon in mg/kg): col-
umns (1), (3) and (5) include the observations
below the median of this distribution (“simi-
lar”), while columns (2), (4) and (6) include
the observations above the median of this dis-
tribution (“different”). As farmers were not
informed about the results of the soil tests until
the end of the study, splitting the sample in this
manner assumes that farmers are aware of the
differences in soil quality (and that this aware-
ness is captured by the active carbon measure)
and test the hypothesis that heterogeneity in
soil quality impede learning. Berazneva
et al. (2018) and Tittonell et al. (2005) provide
evidence that this underlying assumption is
not unreasonable in this context.
Table 5. Correlates of Knowledge for Demonstration Plot Farmers at Endline, in 2015OLS
Regression of Knowledge Score at Endline
Soybean Hybrid maize
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Yield on BPA subplot on local demonstration plot
[in 50 kg bags/acre]
0.042 0.018**
(0.028) (0.007)
Start of the rain (days) −0.018 −0.005
(0.012) (0.009)
Total amount of rain (mm) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of times flood (flood = more than 50 mm/1 day) −0.221* −0.152
(0.127) (0.279)
Observations 61 68 101 101
R-squared 0.115 0.213 0.213 0.183
Note:This table present the results of a linear regression with dependent variable: Knowledge score at endline. Columns (1) and (2) refer to soybean and columns
(3) and (4) to hybrid maize. The knowledge score for soybean is a number out of 6, whereas the knowledge score for hybrid maize is a number out of 8. Columns
(1) and (3) consider use yield on the BPA subplot as the main independent variable of interest, which refers to the maximum yield on the BPA subplots on the
local demonstration plot. Columns (2) and (4) consider various rainfall aggregates as the main independent variables. Other control variables included but not
reported: gender household head, age household head, education household head (years), number of householdmembers, number of adult householdmembers,
maximum education level in the household, acreage of land owned, value of all assets (excluding land), relevant yield expectations at baseline, and whether the
household cultivated hybrid maize in 2013–14 (for columns (3) and (4) only). Sample includes the club farmers in the demonstration plot villages.Whether or not
farmer is in a club is determined by the self-reported club status at endline. Note that the sample size is lower than for the soybean regressions. This is due to
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The results indicate that an increase of 1 kg/
ha in the gap between the BPA and control
soybean subplots is associatedwith an increase
in the endline beliefs of 0.77 units (out of a
possible score of 20) for farmers who have
soils similar the demonstration plot soil and is
not associated with an increase (or decrease)
for farmers whose soils are more dissimilar.
The results for hybrid maize are qualitatively
similar. An increase of the BPA performance
on the local demonstration plot (compared to
the control plots) by 1 kg/ha is associated with
an increase in endline beliefs of 1.00. There is
no statistically significant effects for farmers
whose soil is dissimilar, nor is there any effect
on the yield expectations of local maize. The
latter can be interpreted as a placebo test: the
CDI demonstrations did not include local
maize, and hence nothing could have been
learned about this crop.32
Correlates of Knowledge
In table 5 we estimate the relationship between
beliefs and learning, as measured through the
crop-specific knowledge score for the demonstra-
tion plot participants, per regression specification
(11; again, including a series of control variables).
We use demonstration plot yields to capture the
farmer’s beliefs about profitability early in the
growing season.We find a statistically significant,
and positive, relationship between the yields
measured and learning of the demonstration plot
participants (soybean is almost statistically signif-
icant at the 10% level)—in columns (1) and
(3) for both soybean and hybridmaize. The point
estimate suggests an increase in 50 kg/ha
increases knowledge by 5%.
To interrogate the causal interpretation of the
results, columns (2) and (4) present the results
using attributes of the demonstration plot rainfall
rather than plot yields. Indeed reverse causality
could explain the results presented in columns
(1) and (3): farmers with better knowledge have
better results. Rainfall, on the other hand, does
not suffer this critique and is correlatedwith crop
development (Bradfort 1990; Çakir 2004; Lobell
et al. 2011).33 We present rainfall analysis in
columns (2) and (4). We note the hypothesized
correlation between rainfall patterns and knowl-
edge of soybean (but no such correlation for
hybrid maize, which suggests that either rainfall
and germination rates were not as closely
related, or farmers’ learning was more uniform
across the various plots, perhaps because maize
is a historically important crop).34,35
Role of Credit Constraints
In appendix table 13, we present the relation-
ship between learning, measured using the
knowledge score, and yield expectations for
farmers whowere invited to participate in field
days. Columns (1) and (3) present the linear
approximation of regression specification
(14), whereas columns (2) and (4) include the
interaction terms. Note that, due to data limi-
tations, we approximate profit gain by yield
expectations. As in previous analyses, we split
the knowledge score into knowledge related
to soybean and knowledge related to maize.
But this time, based on figure 1, we include
only the credit-intensive technologies in the
soybean score and the labor-intensive technol-
ogies in the maize score. We focus on one con-
trol variable: farmer wealth. We use “having
obtained input credit in the previous season”
as a proxy for the relevant wealth variable. If
the farmer answers no to this question, the
farmer is likely more credit constrained.
We note a weak positive correlation
between the credit access and the knowledge
score for soybean (p-value 0.11) in column
32Note that we did not estimate regression (4) for the field-day
farmers. The goal of regression (4) is to investigate step 1 of the
learning model, that is, the Bayesian updating process of yields.
Although ideally one would like to compare these processes for
the two sets of farmers, we have no variation in the demonstration
plot performance observed by the field-day participants as they
attended only one of two field-day sites (and we collected data
only at one site within our study area). In addition, we did not col-
lect soil data among all farmers in the field-day villages and noted
that the quality of the yield expectation data was poorer in the
non-demonstration plot villages, possibly as they had no experi-
encemeasuring plots in the sameway as demonstration plot partic-
ipants had done as part of the research project.
33We define three statistics of the distribution: start of the rainy
season, the total amount of rainfall, and the number of flood days
(defined as >50 mm/day). The latter, in particular at the start of the
season, can be quite damaging for germination (Wenkert, Fausey,
and Watters 1981; Martin, Cerwick, and Reding 1991; Githiri
et al. 2006).
34We also used rainfall as an instrument for observed demon-
stration plot yields but noted a weak instrument problem.
Although using the reduced form estimation does not resolve this
matter, it allows one to gain insight into the relationship between
the instrument and the outcome variable (Murray 2006).
35Appendix table 8 presents the results of the regression specifi-
cation (12), correlating the (planned) adoption score with demon-
stration plot performance and rainfall indicators. Although we see
little correlation between demonstration plot yields and overall
adoption scores, we note that this is not unexpected because adop-
tion interacts with budget constraints in a complicated manner in
the absence of credit markets. In appendix table 9, we present
the analysis for field-day farmers and find no statistically signifi-
cant correlations. Measurement error in beliefs and omitted vari-
able bias might play a significant role, and we refrain from
overinterpretation.
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(1), but a nonsignificant interaction effect in
column (2). The coefficient on our credit mea-
sure in column (1) suggests that farmers who
are not credit constrainedmight bemore likely
to learn something about the (credit-inten-
sive) soybean technologies. The (hybrid)
maize results act as a placebo test. The knowl-
edge maize questions included here focused
on labor-intensive technologies; and we find
no difference in learning between credit con-
strained and non-credit constrained farmers.
In figure 2, we consider a non-parametric
version of equation (14) for demonstration
plot farmers. In this case, we have a better
measure for the profit gains, as we observed
the demonstration plot performance. On the
left-hand side of the panel in figure 2 are
farmers who observed a small difference in
yields between the soybean BPA and control
plots (smaller than the median), whereas the
right-hand side are farmers who observed rel-
atively large differences (greater than the
median). The horizontal axis represents
farmer wealth levels using a principal-
component based asset index (Michelson,
Muñiz, andDeRosa 2013) and the vertical axis
represents farmers’ knowledge of soybean
conditional on a set of individual characteris-
tics. According to our hypothesis, only wealthy
farmers on the right-hand side panel should
exhibit higher levels of learning, which we
are able to confirm. Note that figure 2 con-
siders soybean only. This relies on the assump-
tion that soybean production is more capital
intensive and, therefore, more expensive. We
do not expect knowledge scores for hybrid
maize to change with wealth because its pro-
duction does not require as costly of inputs as
soybean production under CDI’s demon-
strated best practices and in effect find no such
relationship in the data (Appendix Figure 6).
Discussion
We studied farmers’ learning about agricul-
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Figure 2. Relationship between knowledge of soy, demonstration plot realizations and wealth.
Note: This figure presents the non-parametric relationship between knowledge of soy and wealth. We apply a control-function approach to variable construction
by using the predicted error term on the vertical access after regressing farmer knowledge against gender household head, age household head, education
household head (years), number of household members, number of adult household members, maximum education level in the household, and acreage of land
owned. The knowledge score for soybean is a number out of 5. The differences between BPA and control subplots by which the panels are split up refer to the
mean differences between these two treatments on the local demonstration plot. Sample includes the club farmers in the demonstration plot villages.Whether or
not farmer is in a club is determined by the self-reported club status at endline. Village-clustered errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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exposure to commonly used extension
methods that range in their intensity of inter-
action. The results suggest the presence of a
two-stage learning process, in which learning
is a choice, constrained by factors such as time,
credit, and cognitive resources.36,37
We find that farmers who participate in
farmer-led demonstration plots form beliefs
about the usefulness of the technologies, with
beliefs conditional on both the agronomic per-
formance of the demonstration plot and how
similar their own soil conditions are to the
demonstration plot soil conditions. These
beliefs correlate with the formation of knowl-
edge about the production processes. As a
whole, these farmers learn about the produc-
tion processes of ISFM technologies critical
for actual adoption and are more likely to plan
to adopt hybrid maize, inoculate soybeans,
and plant fertilizer trees. Other researchers
have found positive effects of demonstration
plots on adoption including Duflo, Kremer,
and Robinson (2008), Kondylis, Mueller, and
Zhu (2017) and Lunduka, Snapp, and
Jayne (2018). Note however that while demon-
stration plot are a common feature of agricul-
tural extension and technology adoption
projects in the region, details including who
manages the plot (an individual farmer, agro-
dealer, extension agent, or farmer group) and
to what degree the plot includes experimental
comparison with control and standard practice
treatment can vary considerably. Hence, any
comparisons between studies need to proceed
carefully (Davis 2008; Kiptot and Franzel 2015).
Farmers attending field days in a different
agro-climatic zones might not result in wide-
spread adoption of a new technology, espe-
cially if farmers need to be convinced that the
technology will increase yields prior to invest-
ing in learning. If, in addition, a field day is too
short to learn all of the production processes,
farmers might not be able to easily progress
to this second stage of learning, even if
convinced about the technology’s yield-
increasing attributes. We find that farmers
invited to attend field days learn considerably
less about the production processes than those
involved in managing demonstration plots.
However, what they do learn is conditional
on the degree to which they are credit con-
strained, and most field-day participants focus
their attention on learning labor-intensive
technologies, such as plant spacing and mulch-
ing. As a result, overall, farmers invited to par-
ticipate in field days do not plan to adopt more
ISFM technologies. Fabregas et al. (2017) find
a similar low impact of farmer field days in
Kenya.
Our results have implications for Malawi and
other sub-Saharan African countries working to
reform extension systems (Evenson 1997;
Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly 2006; Davis
2008). The Malawian government’s extension
system is under significant strain. Under-
resourced extension workers, generally
equipped with a bicycle only, are expected to
cover long distances and to conduct a range of
government and non-government activities with
minimal support (see Knorr, Gerster-Betaya
andHoffman 2007). In our study area, each gov-
ernment extension agent is in charge of 2,000 to
3,000 farming households. Many institutions for
training agricultural extension agents have
closed, and extension workers receive a rela-
tively small fixed monthly salary. This situation
has led to pervasive problemswithmoral hazard
and adverse selection (MEAS 2012; CISA-
NET 2013; MAIWD 2016).38,39
Despite these challenges, government
extension workers remain a main source of
information for farmers. Ragasa and
Niu (2017) note that almost 70% of Malawian
households who received advice from external
sources received it from government exten-
sion agents. In our study area, 60% of farmers
report interacting with their government
extension agent in the last year.
Our results have implications for such an
extension system. Although farmers learn
more from demonstration plots compared to
farmer field-days, field days are often a less
36Van Campenhout (forthcoming) provides a direct test of this
model using a randomized controlled trial. The program random-
izes the provision of knowledge about technologies and informa-
tion about potential yields. He does not find an (average) effect
on adoption of either program component among Ugandan
farmers.
37This distinction between knowing about the existence of the
technology and learning its attributes has also been documented
by others. Kabunga, Dubois, and Qaim (2012) noted that although
many farmers in Kenya have heard about tissue culture in
bananas, few know the details required to implement the technol-
ogy. Lambrecht et al. (2014) find that although awareness about
fertilizers has spread widely among farmers in Congo, direct con-
tact with extension agents is what contributes to adoption.
38BenYishay and Mobarak (2019) show that incentivizing
extension agents by paying them for farmer knowledge improve-
ments improves farmers’ uptake of these technologies in Malawi.
Dal Bó et al. (2018) show promising results from tracking exten-
sion workers via GPS in Paraguay.
39Niu and Ragasa (2017) assess information efficiency along the
knowledge transmission chain from researchers to extension
agents, lead farmers, and other farmers, and note that information
loss mostly happens at the extension agent to lead farmer link.
20 Month 2020 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
expensive option. In our study, hosting one
farmer field day for around 200 farmers costs
about 650 USD total, or about 3.25 USD per
farmer, whereas organizing one demonstra-
tion plot for about 20 farmers costs 281 USD,
about 14 USD per farmer.
We re-iterate that this study is not an evalua-
tion of the relative effectiveness of field days ver-
sus demonstration plots, and we do not suggest
that field days should be discarded as a strategy.
Building on what we have learned, we suggest
the following improvements in field days.
First, field days may provide toomuch infor-
mation in too short a time period, giving
farmers insufficient chance to absorb the
details. This implies that, at field days, farmers
should be given tools that will allow them to
learn the information presented more effec-
tively. Examplesmight include pamphlets with
pictures of the inputs used and measuring
spoons to measure the correct amounts of
inputs (see Duflo et al. 2013).
Second, the fact that farmers’ learning
appears to be constrained by markets suggests
that agricultural extensionmight need a recou-
pling with market activities and, in particular,
credit interventions in order to be effective.
In Malawi, extension agents used to perform
an additional role as regional credit officers.
Although conflict of interest should be
avoided, providing farmers access to credit
while introducing a new intervention is likely
to affect uptake and learning given evidence
that credit access itself influences how open
the farmer is to receiving information on
capital-intensive technologies.40
Third, heterogenous growing conditions
may play a role in influencing what farmers
take away from field days. In this regard, an
in-village demonstration plot might be a better
choice, with the caveat that a low yield could
result in a “non-adoption” trap. Demonstra-
tion plots in various conditions are to be
recommended; with participants being
matched to attend field days at demonstration
plots that match their own growing conditions.
Finally, it may be that field days could be
used in sequence with demonstration plots or
other more intensive methods of teaching
farmers. The field days could serve to intro-
duce a new technology and to focus on its
broad features, demands, and processes and
this initial introduction could be followed by
methods employing more detailed exposure,
perhaps based on farmer demand.
In terms of further research, although the
limited time frame of this study does permit a
detailed study of learning spillovers (and,
relatedly, strategic learning interactions), we
recognize their importance and appeal to
extension models: in the training and visit
extension model, for example, extension
agents are updated with the latest technologies
and generally visit lead farmers who are
expected to teach farmers in their community.
The extent to which adoption spreads through
the communities through social learning is
expected to depend on the degree of heteroge-
neity between farmers, as well as the structure
of the social network, the identities of the first
adopters, and whether and how lead farmers
are encouraged (Griliches 1957; Foster and
Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004; Bandiera
and Rasul 2006; Conley and Udry 2010;
Chuang and Schechter 2015; Maertens 2017;
Michelson 2017). Beaman et al. (2018) use a
network-theory approach to better identify
these lead farmers in order to maximize learn-
ing and adoption in their communities. Shi-
kuku et al. (2019) and BenYishay and
Mobarak (2019) both use a randomized con-
trol trial to vary incentives for, respectively,
lead farmers and extension agents and find
that both respond to incentives. We see this
type of research, which combines network the-
ory with realistic models of learning and
behavior with heterogenous agents (in terms
of cognitive ability as in Barham et al. 2018,
more general, skills as in Laajaj and
Macours Forthcoming, or “locus of control,”
as inMalacarna 2018) as a fruitful way forward
in extension research.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material are available at
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
online.
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